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Abstract 
 
The new competition, the EMNCs from the developing parts of our world are companies that 
have finally managed to get the rightful attention. Some argue that their occurrence is 
something that will drive the world forward for decades to come while others point them out 
as a threat to the living standards of the mature Western markets. 
 
Our focus, when writing about these competitors has been on their internalization and the 
strategies when choosing to expand abroad to developed countries. Besides from this we have 
gathered a lot of information about the subject in general and the theories mentioned about 
why EMNCs do expand the way they do. By comparing our research results with the general 
theories we have tried to see if the earlier theories are still up to date and if there is 
something new worth mentioning. 
The results of our thesis showed that many of the theories mentioned by other authors about 
the subject are still relevant when comparing with the chosen EMNCs that we wrote about. 
 In addition, differences between the EMNCs in the two chosen industries, steel and 
telecommunication, have been identified. The use of for instance Joint Ventures is much more 
common in the telecommunication industry than in the steel industry. Acquisitions and 
mergers on the other hand seem to be the more common way of doing business in the steel 
industry that generally is in need of consolidation. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In the first decade of the new millennia a shift has been visible in the global economy, a shift 
in which the developing countries have taken over the leading role as the global engines that 
drive the economy forwards. This sudden growth of emerging countries has been possible 
thanks due to the big amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) received from the 
multinational corporations (MNCs) of the developed countries. It is with the massive infusion 
of capital, technology, marketing connections and managerial expertise that the developing 
countries have managed to economically transform themselves and experience the growth that 
has occurred over the last two decades (Aykut & Goldstein, 2006).  
 
This has proven itself in the rise of EMNCs over the last two decades. In an edition in the 
magazine Fortune on the headquarter locations of the top 500 companies in the world showed 
that 61 of them were stationed outside the Triad (the North Atlantic and Japan) and Oceania. 
This was a substantial rise in comparison with 1988 when the number was only 26. (Aykut & 
Goldstein, 2006). 
 
The first research about EMNCs began some 30 years ago when the first wave of overseas 
expansion made by companies from a few countries developing countries took place (Lecraw, 
1977; Lall, 1983; Wells, 1983). This first group included Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong 
(China), India, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (Province of China). Later on by the 
end of the 1980s the number of countries increased to include also countries like Chile, China, 
Egypt, Malaysia, Mexico, Russian Federation, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey (Aykut & 
Goldstein, 2006). As of 2003 the OFDI (Outward Foreign Direct Investment) of the 
developing countries had surpassed the OFDI from the developed countries (Aykut & 
Goldstein, 2006). 
 
The increased growth of OFDI from the developing countries has been one thing to take into 
consideration when speaking about EMNCs. The other one, more interesting one, has been 
the flow, where does the OFDI go, to which countries and continents? When speaking about 
MNCs the trend has always been north-south. These pattern flows have been confirmed by 
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some theories for instance the eclectic paradigm (OLI). However they have proved 
themselves to be inadequate when speaking about the EMNCs. The EMNCs seem to follow 
patterns different from those for MNCs and therefore impose as an interesting subject. 
1.2 Problematization 
The problem lies in the theories that try to explain the expansion abroad. Most of the them 
serve to explain why MNCs from developed countries expand, what forces them, which pull 
and push factors exist and what the benefits of expanding abroad are. However these theories 
do not apply to the EMNCs and their strategies. The differences in the strategies between 
MNCs and EMNCs lie in the historical, political and cultural backgrounds of the EMNCs.  
Therefore new theories are needed to give an adequate picture of their expansions. 
 
1.3 Purpose and research question 
The purpose of this thesis is to compare the chosen theories with the expanding strategies 
undertaken by EMNCs. With this we hope to see if we can notice any differences between the 
industries in regard to the chosen theories as well as between the selected companies. 
 
The expansion of EMNCs to developed countries has created a higher need to grasp their 
underlying motives in order to understand why they choose to expand to developed countries. 
It is therefore important that the MNCs of the developed countries are prepared for what 
awaits them from these new foreign competitors. 
 
Research Question 
- Compare the chosen theories with the expanding strategies undertaken by the EMNCs. 
- Which differences exist between the expansion strategies of the EMNCs in the Steel 
industry and those in the Telecommunication industry in regard to the chosen 
theories?  
1.4 Delimitation 
Our goal would have obviously been to give the reader a broad as possible understanding of 
EMNCs and their expansions into developed countries, but in order to do this we would have 
been forced to look more or less into every industry. Due to the limitations given to us of size 
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and time we narrowed it down to two chosen industries, the Steel industry and the 
Telecommunication industry. 
 
The reason why we chose the Steel industry is because it contained a high degree of EMNCs 
that are top leaders in this industry. In addition they originate from the largest emerging 
countries, the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China).  
 
The reason why we chose the Telecommunication industry is because of its specific 
characteristics when it comes to modes of entry and how this fairly new industry functions in 
terms of LLL. In addition some of the companies in this industry have their origins in 
countries that lie in continents rarely mentioned when talking about emerging countries, for 
instance Orascom from Egypt, Africa. By having selected these two industries we consider to 
have covered the global reach of emerging countries as much as possible. 
 
When choosing the different companies for our practical examples, we focused on the 
companies that would best describe diverse sides of the strategies used both in terms of home-
base and in the case of differences in international approaches. The explanations of the chosen 
companies within the two industries are explained below. 
 
The Steel companies 
 
- BaoSteel was chosen as the representative for China. The choice of BaoSteel was not 
obvious because China contains a huge number of Steel companies that are some of 
the most eminent in the industry. Because of their non-expansion strategy we decided 
that BaoSteel would function as a unique example in the Steel industry.  
 
- Severstal, with its ambitions to serve the industry with high value products while on 
the other hand having a strongly pro-acquisition CEO felt as the best Russian 
representative in this thesis.  
 
- Gerdau was chosen as the Brazilian flag barrier in this thesis. The reason was that 
they differ from the other Steel companies in that sense that they operate mainly with 
small mills and do it very successfully.  
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- Tata Steel, the Indian giant whose strength lie in its cost leadership was added as the 
last member. After having struggled early in the 1990s with inefficiency problems this 
Indian giant has in the last 5-10 years turned their attention towards acquisitions of 
steel companies from developed countries. 
 
The Telecommunication industry 
- America Móvil (AM) was chosen partly because of its Latin American origin, but 
mostly due to their modes of entry. Their expansion through strategic acquisitions in 
which they take advantage of the acquired companies‟ problems embodies one 
specific mode of entry used by EMNCs. 
- Huawei, the largest Chinese company within the telecommunication industry is 
perhaps the best example of how LLL can work for a company from the EMs. Today 
they function as a benchmark and a role model for new firms in the industry with 
global aspirations.  
- Orascom. In order to give a broad picture of the presence of EMNCs in the global 
markets we felt the need of an African representative. Orascom was long the African 
success story but have been experiencing some turbulent times in recent years. Their 
aggressive expansion strategy also represent a way of going global not represented 
elsewhere in our examples. 
 
- ZTE. With China being the most prominent player of the developing countries, we 
felt obligated to show differences and similarities of the two largest Chinese 
companies to fully understand the complexity of Chinese MNCs. 
Limitations were made in the choice of theories. The reason behind this is because we wanted 
to take the theories that we felt best suited the EMNCs when trying to explain their expansion 
to the developed countries. 
 
The theories of selection, FSA/CSA (Firm Specific Advantage/Country Specific Advantage) 
and the LLL (Linkage/Leverage/Learning) theory will be covered and later intervened with 
the expansion strategies of the EMNCs in the analysis.  
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Our main theory can be found within the theory of OLI and in its framework FSA/CSA. In 
this framework one can identify several differences in addition to several similarities between 
the companies. Later on in the thesis, we aim to use the FSA/CSA matrix to map the 
companies looked upon. We feel that the FSA/CSA theory is the one that best helps to 
describe the global expansion of EMNCs. 
 
The LLL will serve to explain the transfer of technology, know-how and managerial expertise 
to the firms of the developing countries. This new theory represents the new research 
conducted about the subject. 
2. Theories 
Because our two main theories both stem from the eclectic theory, we will first start off with 
an explanation of that framework. Detailed descriptions of its expansions, the FSA/CSA 
matrix and the LLL will then act as the foundation upon which our analysis will derive from. 
2.1 OLI Paradigm/The eclectic theory 
The OLI theory was developed by John H. Dunning. This theory was presented for the first 
time in a lecture at the Nobel event of 1976 (Pedersen, 2003). It explains the international 
movements of companies based on four aspects: 
 
- The function of the markets: According to Dunning the differential rates of return 
between countries is one of the reasons for FDI (Pedersen, 2003). 
 
- Market imperfections: Through FDI companies can avoid trade barriers such as high 
tariffs. 
 
- Firm behaviour: Various financial transactions can be used to explain 
firm/investment behaviour e.g. cash-flow, expenditure on R&D etc. 
 
- Departure conditions in the host country: These include things like political 
instability, social unrest, incentive systems etc. (Pedersen, 2003) 
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The OLI should be seen as a framework which decision makers in companies can use in order 
to make decisions whether or not to internationalize. The first thing they must look at is if 
they have ownership advantages over foreign competition. Such advantages could be a firm-
specific resource or capability that puts the firm ahead and can be used when entering a new 
market to gain a superior position (Brakman & Garretsen, 2008). 
 
The second is called location advantages. It focuses where on the foreign market the MNCs 
choose to locate (Neary, 2008). It says that, all things equal, if getting customers in another 
market is worth the cost of entrance, the company should enter that market (Brakman & 
Garretsen, 2008). 
 
Third but not least is the Internalization advantages. It deals with the fact that what the 
company has done in one country when it comes to integration and structure of the company 
is scalable. Therefore the firms should look into how they can integrate foreign subsidiaries or 
offices into the domestic structure (Brakman & Garretsen, 2008). 
2.2 FSA/CSA matrix 
Figure: 2.1: The FSA/CSA matrix 
 
The FSA/CSA theory is an extension of the OLI 
theory mentioned above. In Rugman´s research when 
trying to explain the nature, performance and strategies 
of MNCs when doing international business, a two 
basic matrix with two building blocks was created 
(Ramamurti & Singh, 2009).  
 
In the context of the FSA/CSA theory the general 
assumption behind why a MNC expands is because of 
its firm-specific advantages (FSA) and country-specific advantages (CSA).  
 
FSAs can be technology based, knowledge based or they can reflect managerial and/or 
marketing skills. (Ramamurti & Singh). Examples of FSAs include financial structure, market 
knowledge and adequate management (Wang & Wu, 2009).  
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The country-specific advantages (CSA) are unique to the business in each country. CSAs 
can be a strong labour force, richness in natural resources (forests, minerals etc.) and cultural 
factors (Rugman, 2007). 
 
In the matrix square above we have four quadrants. Quadrant 1 consists of companies that 
are generally cost leadership ones. They are generally resource based and/or mature, 
internationally oriented who produce a commodity-type product. Their competitive strength 
lies in the CSAs of location and energy costs. Quadrant 2 consists of companies who have 
no FSAs or CSAs. These companies are inefficient and or preparing to exit or restructure. 
Companies in quadrant 4 are companies with a strong brand and have FSAs in marketing 
and customization. The companies that lie in quadrant 3 can choose to follow any of the 
strategies listed above because of the strength of both their FSAs and CSAs. (Ramamurti & 
Singh, 2009).  
2.3 The LLL theory 
The use of Mathew´s LLL framework can be of great applicability when covering the 
different forces and movements present in the global economy. Rather than looking at what a 
company has, it focuses upon what they can gain and accomplish through the LLL process 
explained below. 
 
Linkage, Leverage and Learning 
 
The LLL is a framework for describing how a multinational firm can go global and how the 
firm can acquire advantages by being multinational rather than national. 
 
Linkage - To start with, a company should use the abundance of opportunities to make 
connections with important developed companies in their field. This is how they gain access 
to knowledge in the first place (Mathews, 2006). This access enables a catch-up process. It 
has been done thousands of times and one company that has been very successful over the last 
decades is Haier who at the early stages of their globalization teamed up with Liebherr 
(Funding Universe, 2011) 
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Leverage – A company can use the linkage to access technology and make sure that a 
technological transfer takes place (Mathews, 2002). In its first form this is often done by 
licenses and/or OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) contract by later getting more 
advanced technology by e.g. sending engineers abroad. 
 
Learning – Through repeated use of linkage and learning a company learns and hence 
catches- up with more advanced competition (Mathews, 2002). 
 
The LLL can be used as an alternative to the OLI framework which is excellent in providing 
the advantages of going global but fails to capture the new multinationals most important 
advantage; the latecomer effect. By being late they gain several advantages such as not having 
to repeat early mistakes or having to invest in infrastructure or R&D at such a high cost as the 
early movers had to. The best application however can be to use OLI and LLL together to 
map all the advantages of being multinational (Mathews, 2002). 
3. Methodology 
To begin with, we wanted to establish a view of how the phenomenon of EMNCs has 
emerged. How it was earlier and how it is today. In order to achieve this we commenced with 
a literature-based research were we found several books of great interest. One of them stood 
out and earns to be mentioned separately here; ‟Dragon Multinational‟ by John Mathews gave 
us a solid background of this new occurrence. Since the book caught our interest we contacted 
the author with some questions.  Pr. Mathews was very helpful and also assisted us in the 
writing of this thesis by providing us with interesting articles regarding specific companies 
that we have looked upon, e.g. Huawei and ZTE. 
 
Another source of information that has proven to be of great importance for us is the annual 
World Investment Report. Especially that of 2006, WIR: FDI from Developing and Transition 
Economies: Implications for Development. This provided us with statistics of the south-north 
and south-south investments which also created a better base for our future research. It also 
made us realise some of the limitations that comes with statistics from some of the countries 
in developing parts of the world. In some cases the info proved to be overvalued and the 
opposite in others. 
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3.1 Method for the Steel Industry 
We started off with first gathering information about the Steel companies. This was mainly 
made through the web where several articles and interviews given by the CEOs were being 
constantly read and gathered. Some of them, for instance those by Dhawan & Roy or 
Khrennikov would later on during our writing process prove themselves to be more valuable 
than we could have hoped. They gave us and hopefully the reader a better understanding into 
how the CEOs of these companies think when it comes to the strategy of their companies, the 
future of them and the future of the steel industry. 
Other information, like for instance different facts, stats and background on these companies 
were more or less entirely taken from the different companies official websites. Some 
information about them and their background was taken from the book “Emerging 
Multinationals from Emerging Countries”. The information about the Steel industry itself was 
taken from mainly two websites, economywatch.com and worldsteel.org. Economywatch 
gave us the general information about what Steel is and in which industries it is mainly used 
while the information about the sizes of the companies and which place they were ranked 
were taken from Worldsteel. 
The gathered information about the countries came from well known authors who were born 
in them and knew the subject very well like for instance Panibratov and Satyanand. Others 
like for instance Morrison and Watkins who wrote about China and India contributed equally 
much as Panibratov and Satyanand despite the fact that they were not from China and India. 
A big credit should also go to the book of Ramamurti and Singh (Emerging multinationals 
from emerging countries” because some parts of that book proved themselves to be more then 
valuable, namely thinking about Gerdau that had its own part in the chapter about Brazilian 
multinationals. The book also contributed with valuable information about the part that the 
Russian government has played. 
As earlier mentioned we noticed how the interviews became the most important part of our 
research and way of describing the companies and the way they think when expanding. The 
fact that the gathered interviews were from the years before, during and after the financial 
crisis of 2008 showed us and hopefully the reader as well how the financial crisis has affected 
the strategic thinking of the companies leaders and their future plans for expanding abroad. 
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3.2 Method for the Telecommunication Industry 
In order to gather information about the Telecom industry we have mostly focused upon 
articles and interviews in order to get an up-to-date view of the situation today. In choosing 
the different companies we wanted to give examples of different strategies and also how 
companies from different countries tackled the internationalization process. 
 
The master thesis; „Globalization strategies of Chinese Companies‟ by Kevin W.B by Jiang 
from the University of Stockholm has served us with interesting facts about the global actions 
of Huawei and ZTE and also helped us with our delimitations. 
 
The main website used in gathering information about the telecom industry has been 
Telecoms.com which provided us with plenty of interesting articles regarding most of the 
companies looked upon and perhaps more importantly, it served as a gateway for finding 
interviews with leaders of the different companies. As was the case with the steel industry, 
this gave us a far better understanding of the global moves of the companies and enabled us to 
go deeper, not only looking at what happened but also why it happened.  
4. Empirical research 
With the theories having been explained above, the base is set to conduct the empirical 
research. We will start off with a brief background about the emergence of EMNCs.  This will 
be followed with country profiles in which we aim to give the reader an even stronger 
understanding of the case examples. In the country profiles we look into the recent modern 
history, the role of the state and the OFDI dispersion of the host countries. The chapter will be 
finalized with the two case industries where the purpose is to show the different expansion 
approaches from the business cases. This will be done by observing eight companies from six 
countries.  
4.1 Background 
The political influence from its government, the intense rivalry between several competitors 
in the same industry and the insufficient demand in the domestic market saw Japanese 
companies being the first EMNCs in the post war era to internationalize (Porter, 1990).  
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Today more reasons apply and the globalization of companies from emerging markets (EMs) 
occurs more often. Companies from EM account now for an estimated ¼ of the total number 
of MNCs in the world. (WIR, 2006) 
One way of measuring the growing importance of EMNCs is looking at the FDI from 
developing countries over time. The World Investment Report covers this field thoroughly 
and presents data that show several periods of rapid expansion of FDI from EM since the 
seventies (WIR, 2006). Even though these periods are interesting the discussion will focus on 
the last two decades where much stronger periods of increased FDI have been present. The 
data from these decades are also more reliable than those of earlier years. The data used from 
1990 and onwards is more precise but it can also suffer from limitations and be 
underestimated in some areas and overestimated in others (WIR, 2006). 
Since 2000, South-North transactions have shown fast growth. This can be seen as a sign of a 
growing need amongst EMNCs to acquire strategic-assets in developed countries. When 
looking at the top 25 acquisitions by EMNCs from developing countries 18 of the 25 largest 
were conducted after 2000, verifying an increased occurrence of large transactions from 
EMNC. Most of which has been takeovers of MNCs from developed countries (WIR, 2006). 
By far, the most important region of the developing world has been Asia, whose share of the 
total stock of FDI from developing countries was 23% in 1980 and has increased in 
importance ever since. In the late eighties the outflow of FDI from developing countries was 
driven by the international expansion of Asian MNC‟s which resulted in Asia‟s share 
increasing to 46% in 1990. The success continued with the exception of a small dip during the 
Asian crisis. In 2005 it peaked with 62% of all the outgoing FDI from developing countries 
being from Asia (WIR, 2006). Of the top 25 deals earlier mentioned, 60% of them were 
conducted by Asian EMNCs. 
4.2 Country Profiles 
4.2.1 Brazil 
Brazil‟s modern political and economic history 
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Before jumping off and writing about OFDI and the role of the state it is vital to first look at 
the effects FDI from MNCs has had on Brazil and its companies and at the same time how it 
has affected the political and economic development during its course.   
FDI from MNCs originating from developed countries began entering Brazil after WWII. The 
motive for choosing Brazil was that the products had already seen their best-before date 
expire on the domestic market while still being demanded for on the immature Brazilian 
(Bresser, 1978). However this became problematical with the choice of the Brazilian 
government to impose an import substitution policy which made exports impossible. These 
new barriers that limited finished products heading off to Brazil forced the MNCs instead to 
start their own production facilities in Brazil. Choosing to produce goods in Brazil proved to 
have a positive effect because it made it possible to integrate the country with the production 
networks of the MNCs and therefore result in increased technological learning (Bresser, 
1978) 
In 1964 Brazil saw the military seize control. They started immediately with implementing a 
patriotic project called “sovereignty and security”. During its being, a couple of local firms 
mainly in the construction industry and in engineering service experienced a huge growth 
which resulted in them looking for new contracts abroad (Fleury, 2010).  
For 20 years one constant problem plagued the economy, a problem that the military had 
problems with solving, namely inflation. Their efforts of trying to do anything about it only 
worsened the economy with an increase of expenses and misuse of resources being some of 
the bi-effects (Melo, 2009). Other efforts unrelated to inflation were those promoting 
Brazilian export in the 1980s. This just worsened the image of Brazil because of their low 
quality products (Fleury, 2010).  
In 1984 the military withdrew and a civilian government took place. What awaited the newly 
elected government was an inflation rate of 224 %. All possible programs were launched in 
order to prevent the inflation rate from further growing but nothing seemed to help. By 1989 
the monthly inflation rate was at 84.32 % (Fleury, 2010)  
The inflation problems started to diminish in the early 1990s. By the end of the year 1992 the 
annual inflation rate figured 1,158 % (Canuto; Rabelo; Silveira, 1997). With the inflation 
problems finally being under control the government set out new economic policy plans and 
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institutional changes that would reorganize the Brazilian productive sector: Liberalization in 
foreign affairs when it came to finance and commerce, further integration with the Mercosur 
countries, implementation of the “Plano Real” of 1994 that had so successfully kept the 
inflation rates low and steady and the increased privatization of Brazilian state-owned 
companies (Canuto; Rabelo; Silveira, 1997).    
The changes in the 1990s have resulted in several positive effects: The country´s economy has 
become stabilized by obtaining the inflation low. This has enabled Brazil attractive for new 
foreign investments. The privatization programs have allowed the formerly state-owned 
companies to gain even more capital and together with the technological know-how transfer 
during the import-substitution era have made them prepared for competition both home and 
abroad.  
The role of the State  
The Brazilian state has a leading role in spurring its MNCs to internationalize. In order to 
make this possible incentives for domestic mergers have been pushed upon Brazilian MNCs. 
Worth mentioning is also BNDES, Brazil‟s national bank which has acted as a credit loaner 
for Brazilian MNCs when choosing to go globally (Finchelstein, 2009).  
OFDI from Brazil 
Brazilian OFDI in year 2009 to different parts of the world was as following: 
- 70 % of all OFDI went to the Americas. Surprisingly the biggest receiver of Brazilian 
FDI in this part of the world is probably the last country one would think of, namely 
the Cayman Islands. The Cayman Islands receive 25 % of the FDI that goes to the 
Americas. The reason behind is that the Cayman Islands are a tax haven. Therefore it 
is not surprising that the British Virgin Islands come in second place with 19 % and 
the Bahamas in third with 17 % (BACEN, 2008). The biggest receiver not to be a tax 
haven is USA which comes in fourth place with 16 %. 
 
- 29 % of all OFDI went to Europe. Here the biggest two receivers were Spain and 
Denmark, both received 21 % each. After them came Luxemburg with 15 %, the 
Netherlands 10 %, Hungary 7 % etc. (BACEN, 2008). 
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- 1 % of the remaining OFDI went to Asia, Africa and Oceania altogether. Here the 
biggest receivers were China and Japan in Asia while the biggest receiver in Africa 
was Angola, a former Portuguese colony (BACEN, 2008). 
When overlooking the geographical distribution of Brazilian OFDI, a couple of things 
become worth commenting. One is the geographical distribution of Brazilian OFDI over time. 
When comparing Brazilian OFDI in 2009 with facts from Brazilian OFDI in 2001 (not shown 
in this thesis) a couple of geographical shifts look apparent. For instance OFDI to the 
Americas has fallen from 86 % to 70 %. Although the number has fallen in the Americas it 
has risen for some countries within it like for instance USA. USA has seen Brazilian FDI 
increase from 1.4 US billion to 9.1 US billion (BACEN, 2008). Europe on the other hand has 
seen Brazilian FDI increase from 12 % to 29 %. The increase in Europe has been the highest 
amongst Spain and Denmark. Spain saw its increase rise from 1.6 US billion to 5.0 US 
billion. Denmark on the other hand felt an even steeper rise from 0.01 US billion to 5 US 
billion (BACEN, 2008).  
4.2.2 Russia 
Russia`s modern political and economic history 
Throughout the most part of the 21th century Russia was a communist republic within the 
Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia moved towards becoming a 
market-economy. The switch to becoming a market-economy did not go that smoothly as 
maybe planned. In the first years after the fall there existed a turbulent period where many of 
the state- owned companies under its then president Boris Jeltsin went into the hands of a few 
business entrepreneurs (Ramamurti & Singh). These entrepreneurs who would later go under 
the name of oligarchs managed during the privatization era with the help of government 
connections buy of the most important Russian state-owned companies for prices exceedingly 
below their market values. (Ramamurti & Singh, 2009).  
In 2000 when Vladimir Putin took the office things started changing. Putin instantly 
decreased the power and influence the oligarchs enjoyed. This became even more visible at 
the start of his second term in 2004 (Ramamurti & Singh, 2009). Many of the oligarchs were 
forced to sell parts of their holdings to the state, sometimes all of them. An example of the 
state taking power away from the oligarchs can be exampled with the case of Rosneft. Rosneft 
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was a little state owned company but became the biggest one in the country when the 
government put the CEO and other executives of back then the biggest oil company in Russia, 
Yukos at trial. When Yukos folded down the company´s assets were auctioned out and 
eventually ended up in the hands of Rosneft (Ramamurti & Singh, 2009).  
During the remainder of Putin‟s second term the role of the state became ever more increased 
when it came to some “strategic” companies and industries. This increasing role of the state in 
the Russian economy and on its MNCs is something we embark on in the section below. 
The role of the State 
As mentioned above the role of the state under Putin‟s second term became more firm. During 
it the government selected forty industrial sectors being believed as important for the 
country´s future and security (Ramamurti & Singh, 2009). This has corresponded in such way 
that the government main aim has been on companies that stand for most part of the export 
and that bring in the biggest tax revenues namely; oil and natural gas companies, refinery 
companies and those in the military industry (Ramamurti & Singh, 2009).  
Despite having increased the state´s role in the economy Putin has stated his support for a 
market economy where he calmed the press in 2006 by saying that he was not planning a 
renationalization of key industries and that foreign companies were welcomed in the Russian 
oil industry (Ramamurti & Singh, 2009). 
Nevertheless there exist some industries in Russia where the state is more or less totally 
absent and the free market operates on its own; consumer, retail, food processing and the 
telecommunication sector (Ramamurti & Singh, 2009).  
OFDI from Russia 
Unfortunately detailed data on Russian OFDI is not accessible and therefore we have chosen 
to instead use a table of Russian mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The table that is seen 
below covers M&A made by Russian MNCs over the last 20 years. With it we hope to at least 
give a glimpse in the geographical dispersion of the outflow of Russian MNCs. 
What can be distinguished when looking on the table is that M&A made by Russian MNCs 
have mostly went in the direction of developed countries. This is confirmed when looking on 
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some of the biggest M&A ever made by Russian MNCs with companies from developed 
countries: Norilsk Nickels acquisition of Lion Ore Mining, Evrazs of IPSCO and Lukoils of 
ERG-SpAISAB (Panibratov & Kalotay, 2009).  
When turning our eyes towards the developing countries we can notice that the majority of 
the M&A have been with companies who originate from the CIS. The big amount of M&A 
made with the CIS countries has to do with the fact that they were once part of the Soviet 
Union and therefore share common historical and cultural ties (Panibratov & Kalotay, 2009). 
Majority of the M&A made with companies from the CIS have been with those that have their 
headquarters in Belarus and the Ukraine. This has been reflected in that the two biggest M&A 
ever made with companies who originate from developing countries have actually been with 
those from Belarus and Ukraine: Gazproms acquisition in 2007 of the Belorussian natural gas 
distribution company Beltransgaz and Evrazs of the Ukrainian iron ore company Sukhaya 
Balka GOK  in 2008 (Panibratov & Kalotay, 2009).   
Figure 4.1. Cross-border M&A purchases by Russian multinationals, by host 
country/region: January 1992- June 1998 (USD million) 
 
Country/Region 1992-1996 1997-2000 2001-2004 2005-2008 
World 
 
511 2211 5498 56 794 
Developed 
sountries 
511 2151 3962 44 287 
Europe 
 
311 1479 2766 30 575 
North America 
 
- 170 1195 13 247 
Other 
developed 
countries 
200 232 - 465 
Developing 
countries 
- - - 3210 
Africa - - - 250 
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Asia & Oceania - - - 2945 
South- East 
Europe and the 
CIS 
- 61 1536 9297 
 
Source: Panibratov & Kalotay, 2009 
It is important to stress out that biggest M&A by Russian companies, both with developed and 
developing countries have been in the natural resource sector. Besides from this they also 
seem to contain the same aim, which is to occupy higher value-added positions in their value-
chains and so attain higher profit margins (Ramamurti & Singh, 2009). This will be once 
again repeated later on in the thesis when covering Severstal.  
4.2.3 India 
India‟s modern political and economic history 
 
India which gained its independence in 1947 chose like many other big developing countries 
at that time an import-substitute strategy. The implemented strategy of self-sufficiency by its 
first prime minister, Jawarharlal Nehru was structured in the same manner as the economy of 
the Soviet Union (Watkins, 1997). This meant that India decided to protect its companies 
from foreign competition and instead focus on domestic production that would provide its 
population with everything it needed.  
 
In order to this the government started with Soviet modelled five year plans. The first one in 
1951-1955 included only some industries while others were left out (Watkins, 1997). The 
second one that followed in 1956-1961 tried to combine British socialism with Mahatma 
Gandhi‟s doctrines. This meant that important consumer goods like for instance luxury goods 
were to be eradicated by the usage of high tariffs or the banning of them (Watkins, 1997). 
Many companies were nationalized during this time and others were forced to get licensing 
approval by the government in order to start a business (Satyanand & Raghavendran, 2010). 
Just like in China the government protected its ineffective companies from going into 
bankruptcy. It also decided where companies could expand (Satyanand & Raghavendran, 
2010) and when they could fire workers or shut down (Watkins, 1997).  
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The planning of the Indian economy by the government was disastrous for all sides, both the 
agricultural and industrial sector. The governments financing, which was to take resources 
from agriculture and give them to unproductive industries resulted only in agricultural 
starvation (Watkins, 1997). In 1971, Indira Gandhi, Nehru´s daughter, tried decreasing 
national poverty by supporting small, labour intensive enterprises. The outcome became 
increased growth. However in comparison with the neighbouring countries the growth in 
India was modest (Watkins, 1997).  
 
A survey by the Economist in 1991 exposed the effects of India‟s strong protectionism. The 
country was ranked as the one with the highest tariffs in the world in 1985 (Watkins, 1997). 
The effects of the high tariffs led later on India to have the lowest ratio of imports to GDP in 
1988.  
 
The movement towards liberalization and the opening of the Indian economy to rest of the 
world started in 1984 when the oldest son of Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi became prime 
minister. With Rajiv Gandhi, gradual changes started being implemented, in form of tax 
reforms and realized reductions in some parts of the industry (Watkins, 1997).  
 
1991 was a year of huge importance with two significant events taking place. The first one 
affected politics with Rajiv Gandhi being tragically assassinated by a suicide bomber. The 
second one affecting the economy was the carried out reforms in July. They meant the 
following things: The abolishment of the enormously high tariffs on goods, the privatization 
of the state-owned companies in nearly all of the industries and the removal of licensing for 
both domestic and foreign companies (Panagariya, 2001). With the lowered restrictions FDI 
from abroad started pouring in. This resulted in increased FDI from 165 $ million in 1992/93 
to $ 4.2 billion ten years later (CIA World Factbook, 2008).  
 
The role of the state 
 
For a long time the state intervened in the country`s economy by setting out strong regulations 
that marginalized the MNCs possibilities of expanding abroad. According to Satyanand & 
Raghavendran three strong regulations existed. Today, all three of them have either been 
scrapped or minimized. Nevertheless we felt obligated to give a brief presentation of them in 
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accordance to give the reader a better understanding of the role the Indian state has played in 
its economy. 
  
- Industrial licensing needed for Indian companies. Today, most of the licensing 
approvals have been lifted and Indian MNCs are now free to produce as much as they 
want and use whatever kind of technology they desire. 
- Restrictions on OFDI. During the restrictions the MNCs were allowed to invest 
abroad only in their core business in developing countries after an agreement with the 
state had been reached. Liberalization acts undertaken by the Indian government like 
for instance the Foreign Exchange Management Act (2000) loosened up these 
regulations for Indian companies. Now MNCs are allowed to invest abroad into 
whatever country or business they prefer.  
- Regulations for foreign investors and for Indian companies borrowing money 
internationally. Foreign investors are now allowed to buy Indian stocks as well as 
Indian companies are allowed to borrow money from international institutions.  
 
OFDI from India 
Table 4.2 Indian OFDI pattern: 1980-2007 
Period Developing Developed 
1980-1989 76.3 % 23.7 % 
1990-1999 56.4 % 43.6 % 
2000-2007 36 % 64 % 
 
Source: Hong, 2011 
 
In the table above we can distinctly see how the pattern for Indian OFDI has shifted from 
developing to developed countries. In the 1980s the majority of the FDI, 76.3 % went to the 
developing countries. This number gradually fell down to 36 % in the years 2000-2007. 
Meanwhile the amount of OFDI to the developed increased from 23.7 % to 61.2 % (Hong, 
2011).  
 
As already explained in the section about the role of the state, different regulations forced the 
MNCs to mostly expand into developing and not developed countries. With them being out of 
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the way, many companies who had managed to become cost leaders and having their products 
improved through R&D started finally entering developed markets (Hong, 2011).  
 
OFDI from India started off with first being market seeking and having the developing 
countries as the main receivers. During this period, the manufacturing sector found itself to be 
the main receiver of OFDI (80 %) (Lall, 1983).  The move towards developed countries 
changed in the 1990s when Indian MNCs shifted to become more high-tech supporting. 
Together with a stronger pro-trade approach, these privately publicly listed companies 
became prominent in such way that they in comparison with EMNCs from other developing 
countries accomplished buy-outs of international companies exceedingly larger then 
themselves (Satyanand & Raghavendran, 2010).  
4.2.4 China 
The modern political and economic history of China 
China´s modern history started in 1949 when China emerged as a communist country under 
the leadership of Mao Zedong. With a new government new processes of changing society 
started being set in motion. Amongst the first to be carried out were those that affected the 
rural population. Farmers found themselves forced to give up their farms in order to 
collectivize them into large communes (Morrison, 2006). Other changes affected the industry 
where production goals, prices and the allocation of the resources all fell in the governments 
hands (Morrison, 2006).  
During the 1960s and 1970s big investments were being ordered out to industrialize China as 
quickly as possible (Morrison, 2006). The government‟s involvement in the industrialization 
of China´s economy resulted that in 1978 almost three-fourths of the entire industrial 
assembly were results of central planning. The regimented central plans had one objective, to 
make China economically self-sufficient (Morrison, 2006). This meant that foreign trade was 
not preferable. Only goods seen as essential in order to reach self-sufficiency were imported. 
The lack of competition and price fluctuation created a stagnated economy and living 
standards well below those of other countries (Morrison, 2006).  
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When Mao Zedong passed away in 1976 Xeng Diapong took over as head leader of the party 
and country. Diapong´s solution to solving the stagnated economy was through economic 
reforms (Hasegawa & Noronha, 2009). The first reforms targeted the countries farmers. They 
allowed farmers to sell a part of their own crops on the free market. Besides from this four 
special economic zones were created alongside China´s coast (Morrison, 2006). The intention 
of the special zones was to attract FDI, boost China´s export and import high-technological 
products. The state also withdrew its strong control over the planning of the economy by 
allowing a part of the power to go the provinces of China and the local ruling governments 
(Morrison, 2006).  
The results became noticeable in the country´s annual GDP growth rates, especially in the 
early 1990s. In the figure below us annual growth rates of 10-14 % in the years 1992-1996 
show levels rarely seen anywhere else in the world. When comparing the difference of GDP 
levels between pre-reform China (5.3 %) and post-reform China (9.7 %) it is pretty clear that 
Diapongs economic reforms have yielded results. 
Figure 4.3 China`s average annual GDP growth rates: 1960-2005 
China´s Average Annual GDP Growth 
Rates 
1960-2005 
5.3 % 1960-1978 (pre-reform) 
9.7 % 1979-2005 (post-reform) 
3.8 % 1990 
14.2 % 1992 
14.0 % 1993 
13.1 % 1994 
10.9 % 1995 
10.0 % 1996 
 
Source: Morrison, 2006 
The role of the state 
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The Chinese governments loosening up of the economy have boosted the country´s inflow of 
FDI and trade with the rest of the world. Between the years 1983 to 2004 the annual FDI into 
China increased from 636 US million to 61 US billion (Morrison, 2006). Export levels versus 
import levels between 1985 to 2005 shows how China has went from deficit levels of 15.3 US 
billion dollars to surplus of 101 US billion dollars (Morrison, 2006). The big trade surplus 
levels with the rest of the world have allowed China to build up the second largest foreign 
exchange reserves in the world. These big foreign exchange reserves have then been utilized 
by the state to support Chinese state- owned companies.   
One third of the state-owned companies that make up the country‟s industrial production have 
for a long time acted as a worrying problem. With more than half of them having terrible 
finances, the state has had no other option than to take on the role as lender of last resort 
(Morrison, 2006). This has forced it to give away help to struggling companies instead to 
profitable ones and also made it reluctant in lowering trade barriers out of the fear that it 
would result into massive bankruptcies amongst the struggling state-owned companies 
(Morrison, 2006).  
The significance of the banking system and the role the state has on it cannot be 
underestimated. It is strongly regulated by the government, which sets the interest rates. When 
companies want do expand abroad they can therefore always count on the state to provide 
them low interest loans (Morrison, 2006).  
OFDI from China 
The Chinese geographical OFDI dispersion for the year 2009 was the following: 
- Asia accounted as the biggest receiver of Chinese OFDI. A total of 75.5 % OFDI 
went in that direction. However it is important to mention that of those 75.5 % a total 
of 88.2 % went to Hong Kong (Hong, 2011). The underlying reason behind this huge 
amount of OFDI to Asia is explained by the close economic relations that exist 
between China and Hong Kong as well as amongst China and South-East Asia (Hong, 
2011). Nevertheless the huge amount of OFDI to Hong Kong cannot alone be 
explained by referring solely on close economic relations. It is explained by something 
called “round-tripping” (Hong, 2011). Round-tripping is when Chinese companies 
move their funds over to Hong Kong because of the favorable conditions that exist 
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there for foreign companies. Later on the money gets reinvested back to China 
because of the beneficial terms that exist for foreign companies operating in China 
(Hong, 2011).   
 
- Latin America came in second place with a total of 12.4 % of the OFDI being placed 
there. The reason behind this big number for Latin America is because of the tax 
haven countries Cayman Islands and Virgin Islands. These two countries alone 
accounted for 95.5 % of the total OFDI to Latin America (Hong, 2011)  
 
- Africa came in third place with 3 % while Europe and North America together 
received 5 %  
4.2.5 Mexico 
 
Mexico‟s modern political and economic history 
 
The case of the economic development of Mexico is a turbulent one.  Few other countries 
have experienced similar turmoil with credit crunches, financial crises and political 
instability. In order to explain its position today as an emerging market with potential but with 
severe problems we will look on its modern economical history, from 1980 and onwards. Our 
focus point will be the economic liberalization which at a first glance appears to contradict the 
general view that liberalization promotes growth.  
 
In the early eighties, Mexico was in a poor state, partly due to external factors such as the two 
oil crises of the seventies, but more significantly due to internal circumstances e.g. 
governmental corruption and increased foreign debt (Moreno-Brid & Ros, 2009).  
 
The election of President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtad in 1982 brought changes that aspired to 
alter the course of Mexico. Among other reforms the Hurtad administration devalued the peso 
and restructured the financial debts through several agreements with its creditors. The purpose 
of the reforms was to promote trade and open up the Mexican economy. The country went 
from being a closed economy to one of the most open within a few years. In 1985 Hurtad 
signed the GATT-agreement (General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade) which resulted in the 
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elimination of most of the country‟s earlier trade barriers. With the measures taken, exports 
experienced a dramatic increase and more importantly made investors abroad pay attention to 
Mexican goods (Tornell A. et. al. 2003). The investors demanded deregulation of the heavy 
regulated financial markets in order for them to invest in Mexico and in 1989 the rules and 
regulations of FDI were finally relaxed (Tornell A. et. al. 2003).   
 
The third and arguably most commonly known measure of economic deregulation in Mexico 
was the signing of the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) agreement in 1993. 
The importance of the agreement did not lie in the reduction of trade barriers because of the 
earlier cuts in the eighties, instead its strength was in the way it reduced the uncertainty of 
investors. For them it reduced the likelihood that the Mexican government would violate 
investors‟ property rights as had been the case earlier. 
 
Tornell, Westermann and Martínez argue that after the deregulation and the opening of the 
economy, Mexico had undertaken all precautions needed for economic development in the 
nineties. However, Mexico failed to deliver. During the period of liberalization (1988 – 1999) 
the GDP grew only at an annual rate of 1.5 % (IMF, 2010). Tornell argues that liberalization 
promotes development but also bring economic volatility. The author found two main reasons 
for why the liberalization did not bring greater success. First of all, Mexico‟s judicial system 
was inadequate to withhold contract enforceability. The processes were complicated and 
sometimes took years to resolve. This resulted in a culture called Cultural de no pago which 
translates into culture of non-payment. Borrowers chose not to pay because they realised that 
the chances of punishment were low. This proved the importance of having a functional 
judicial system to support the economy.  
 
The second reason was the governmental response to the above mentioned non-performing 
loans (NPL). The regulatory discipline was not sufficient and only a small share of the NPLs 
was officially recognized (Tornell A. et. al. 2003). To deal with the NPLs the government 
adopted a policy of exchanging the loans for ten-year government bonds that paid interest but 
were not tradable. This turned out to be an inflexible and poor solution which was very costly 
for the Mexican government (Tornell A. et. al. 2003).  
 
The role of the state 
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As in all emerging markets, the government of Mexico has played an important role for the 
domestic firms. In the text above we have seen how that role has had both positive and 
negative aspects. Positive in terms of all the alterations made to open up the Mexican 
economy and by forming and signing the important trade agreements (GATT and NAFTA). 
The negative effects of the state have had to do with the insufficient judicial system and the 
treatment of the NPLs. 
 
OFDI from Mexico 
 
The deregulations caused better access to foreign markets and hence, Mexican companies 
began to abandon their domestic scope, they realised the potential of the new opportunities 
abroad and adopted more aggressive strategies (ECLAC, 2005).  
 
Figure 4.4. OFDI-stock from Mexico: 1980-2009 
 
Source: UNCTAD. UnctadStat: 2010 
 
As the graph above shows the OFDI of Mexico started to increase rapidly around 2000. The 
reason behind this is that the help of the ingoing FDI and the deregulations caused Mexican 
firms to develop domestically during the late nineties before reaching the level of maturity 
needed to go abroad (Daniels, et al 2007). 
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In the case of Mexico the geographical dispersion is heavily weighted towards the United 
States. One study implies that the US stands for over 98% of total OFDI for Mexico. The 
reason behind this is the cultural and linguistic similarities due to the large population in the 
US that has Mexican origin (Daniels, et al 2007). 
 
According to „Foreign investment in Latin America and the Caribbean‟, what brought 
Mexican companies to invest abroad had to do with both pull and push factors. Three pull and 
push factors were identified. The three pull factors were: 
 
1) Location advantages for the host-country. This implies that geographical proximity 
as well as cultural and linguistic similarities is of great significance. The most 
important issue of this factor is the Mexican diaspora in the US.  
2) Strategic and competitive advantages. Examples of this factor include, improving 
logistic systems, turning national brands into regional ones and the forming of 
alliances with MNCs from other countries to make use of the LLL theory and gain 
knowledge. 
3) The impact of policy changes in host-countries. Mexican firms took advantage of 
many free trade agreements and therefore gained access to their partners‟ markets 
(Franco-Navarette, 2010). 
The three identified push factors were; 
 
1)  Limited domestic market. Many domestic firms faced matured domestic markets 
and felt the need of going abroad to keep their profitability 
2) The internationalization of competitive advantages. The need for Mexican firms to 
consolidate existing export markets. 
3) Local policy changes. E.g. Measures undertaken for deregulation, enabling better 
access to foreign markets. (Franco-Navarette, 2010) 
4.2.6 Egypt 
Egypt‟s modern political and economic history of Egypt 
 
In the second part of the 20
th
 century, Egypt from an economic point of view saw itself being 
on the verge of collapsing. In 1952, the new regime under its leader Gamal Abdul Nasser 
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leader inherited an economy with substantial problems. The majority of the people were poor 
and the largest bulk of the economy was controlled by a group of few rich foreigners. 
(Niblock & Wilson, 1999) 
 
The new administration undertook the heavy task of restructuring the economy and within a 
decade it had transformed it into one where the state held a dominant position with a huge 
public sector including large manufacturing companies as well as all the communication and 
financial enterprises. Other cautions taken by the Nasser regime included fixing the exchange 
rate and also the substantial development planning. (Niblock & Wilson, 1999)  
 
The positive effects of the measurements taken by the Nasser regime were not realised by the 
Egyptian people and left the economy with both economic and political distress. This unrest 
peaked in 1970 with Nasser being overthrown by Sadat (Niblock & Wilson, 1999). The Sadat 
regime built on the good aspects of the work of Nasser but represented a shift towards 
economic liberalization. In 1973 he declared a new policy called infitah which translates into 
„open door‟. The purpose of the new policy was to lighten up the regulations, encourage the 
private sector and promote the inflow of foreign capital (Goldstein & Bonaglia. 2006.) 
 
The infitah-policy was successful in terms of ingoing FDI and large inflows of foreign funds 
were experienced in the late seventies. Most of the foreign investments to Egypt came from 
the US and their investments contributed largely to the great success of the Egyptian economy 
in the eighties.  
 
The role of the state 
 
Egypt`s development after WWII has been very dependent on governmental actions. This has 
been evidential in the creation of the public sector which enabled the creation of both a 
communicational infrastructure in addition to a functioning financial infrastructure. Another 
example is the move towards liberalization made by the Rabat regime which allowed Egypt to 
receive large amounts of FDI. Today that shift marks the beginning of the LLL process for 
Egyptian firms. It caused MNCs from more developed market to enter Egypt and hence 
enabled partnerships between domestic firms in Egypt and the foreign companies from the 
West. Through that linking and learning process, Egyptian firms gained knowledge which 
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was needed first, for development, and later for expanding its operations abroad. 
 
Egypt and OFDI 
 
Egypt represents one of the least regulated countries in Africa when it comes to OFDI. This 
led to the large outgoing flows of FDI in the early 1990s (Goldstein & Bonaglia, 2006). 
  
In an attempt to promote both inward and outward FDI flows, Egypt has signed bilateral 
investment treaties with 83 countries (FDIE, 2005). These agreements helped especially 
during the 1990s when the OFDI cumulative stock doubled in size between 1990 and 1996 
after showing annual growth figures of 12 % (Goldstein & Bonaglia, 2006). 
 
As of today, most of the OFDI from Egypt steams from two companies, Orascom in the 
Telecommunication industry which will be more thoroughly covered later in the thesis and 
Oriental Weavers (Goldstein & Bonaglia, 2006). These two companies have had a great effect 
on its region and are now taking the next step to expanding globally e.g. with Orascom‟s 
purchase of WIND Italy.  
 
Further actions by the government in encouraging Egyptian OFDI are underway, such as the 
issuing of investment insurance guarantees and the signing of upgraded bilateral agreements 
(Goldstein & Bonaglia. 2006). If they can continue their pursuit of creating national 
champions such as Orascom and Oriental Weavers is still a question unanswered question. 
4.3 The Steel Industry 
Steel, an alloy that mostly consists of iron ore is a material that is widely used in the world in 
various industries. The industries where the need for steel has been the biggest are the 
following: Automobile, Construction, Infrastructure, Oil and Gas and the Container industry 
(Economywatch, 2006).  
 
When it comes to determining which countries use steel more than others, a historical shift 
can be seen. When the Second World War ended the consumption and the demand for steel 
was mainly driven by the developed countries. This big postwar boom doubled the demand 
for steel in the 1950-70s. The growth rate in the years 1960-1974 was as big as 5.5 % 
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(Economywatch, 2006). In the 1980s the industry took a minor dive, but would soon be 
followed by an increase in demand by the start of the 1990s. The reason behind this was the 
deregulation, privatization and openness towards foreign FDI made by the developing 
countries. Since then countries like Brazil, Russia, India and China (also known as BRIC) 
have seen themselves rise as the leading countries in terms of demand of steel as well as 
leaders in steel production. Many companies emerged in the BRIC area, and some of them 
would become leaders in the world as far as steel supplying goes. This is observed on the 
website Worldsteel where BaoSteel ranked at second place in the world behind Arcelor-Mittal 
in 2009. Tata Steel was the 7
th
 largest producer and Severstal, the big giant placed 9
th
. Last 
but not least, Gerdau, the biggest South American steel company inhabited 13
th
 place 
(Worldsteel, 2011).  
4.3.1 Baosteel 
BaoSteel is a state owned giant in a country where the production of crude steel is the biggest 
in the world. BaoSteel came into terms in 1978 with the consolidation of two Chinese 
companies, Shanghai Metallurhical Holding Group (SMHG) and Meishan Iron & Steel Co. 
Since then the company has grown into a multinational one with 104,914 employees and sales 
networks in three different continents (Baosteel, 2011).  
 
Despite being one of the global leaders in their industry, BaoSteel in comparison to other steel 
companies and rivals grows more or less entirely by acquisitions made at home. In December 
2009, Bloomberg reported that BaoSteel‟s expansion plans oversea were only to focus on raw 
materials until a clear picture of demand for global steel had emerged. In the report, the 
chairman of BaoSteel Mr. Xu Lejiang stressed out how not only BaoSteel but also other 
Chinese steelmakers would avoid expansions abroad in the next 3-5 years as they would first 
select to focus on domestic mergers. He also mentioned how the majority of the Chinese 
steelmaker‟s did not have a clear strategy when it came to overseas expansion. Mr. Xu 
Lejiang stated also that he wanted to focus on resources and not building new plants unless he 
had a clear idea of how the market would grow in these countries (Topensea International, 
2009).  
 
The reason behind why Mr. Xu Lejiang reasons in this way may have to do with the research 
made by Rugman about Chinese MNCs and their acquisitions abroad. In his research he 
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mentioned a couple of Chinese companies in other industries that had failed with their 
acquisitions. He addressed how these acquisitions were unsuccessful because they lacked 
FSAs and that their objectives had only been to secure natural resources and gain market 
access. They themselves lacked both the FSAs and the managerial capabilities of integrating 
foreign acquisitions and developing anything that resembled dynamic capabilities (Ramamurti 
& Singh, 2009).  
 
If BaoSteel make up their mind and choose to expand it will likely be so to developing areas. 
Russia, Brazil, India, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Africa were all places mentioned 
by Mr. Xu Lejiang. The developed markets of North America and Europe were the only ones 
left out. Although Chinese Steelmakers are unwilling to expand abroad exceptions have 
occurred, for instance when accumulating natural resources. The 15 % purchased stake in the 
Australian company Aquila Resources Ltd for AUD 285 million in 2009 was such one 
(Topensea International, 2009). This was made when Aquila announced plans to develop an 
iron ore project in Western Australia and coal mines in Queensland. A reason besides gaining 
access to natural resources can be found in the huge demand from China which has led to a 
shortfall in the global shipping capacity (Radhika & Pallavi, 2006). This in turn has led to 
increased freight costs and made the steel companies to reconsider the logics of transporting 
bulky raw materials like ore and coal across continents. It is more logic to make the steel near 
the raw materials and then to ship the semi-finished steel, that is much less bulky to the final 
markets for finishing (Radhika & Pallavi, 2006).   
4.3.2 Severstal 
Severstal (in Russian “North Steel”), is the biggest Russian Steel producer. It was founded in 
the 1930s with the discovery of Kola iron cores and Pechora coal in the North-Western region 
of Russia. From its foundations throughout its life span in the USSR, the company went under 
the name “Cherepovets Metallurgical Plant”. Following the privatization of Russian state 
owned companies in the early 1990s it changed its name into “Severstal” and registered itself 
as a Joint Stock Company in 1993 (Severstal, 2011).  
 
The core of the company lies mostly in high added value products and unique niche products. 
To be capable of competing in this sector, Severstal has engaged itself in both domestic and 
foreign M&As. This has been the primary growth strategy used not only by Severstal but also 
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by other Russian MNCs in the sector. By doing this they have primarily aimed at developing 
a value-added growth strategy that would eventually lead to higher profit margins (Ramamurti 
& Singh).  
 
In 2008 Severstal reorganized itself by dividing the company into three divisions: Severstal 
Russian Steel, Severstal Resources and Severstal International. The last one, Severstal 
International has its operations in North America, in Italy through its subsidiary Lucchini and 
in France (Ascometal) where the company is leader in the European SBQ (Special Bar 
Quality) market (Severstal, 2011).  
 
It‟s CEO and main stock owner, Mordashov has always had a goal in seeing Severstal emerge 
as the largest steel company in the world. In 2006 he was close to achieving this when 
meetings were being held between Severstal and at that time the second biggest Steel 
producer in the world Arcelor. Arcelor‟s board was positive towards the merger of the two 
companies because of the hostile bid being given to them earlier in the same year by Mittal. In 
the end the merger failed when Arcelor‟s stockholders decided to merge with Mittal rather 
than with Severstal. This did not offset Mordashov. In the spring of 2007 Severstal became 
the fourth biggest steelmaker in the US when its subsidiary, Severstal North America, bought 
the Michigan based company, Victory Industries. Victory Industries was a firm that 
specialized in machining, welding, and fabricating services – all downstream, value-added 
uses of steel. A year later in 2008, just a couple of months before the financial crisis broke 
out, Mordashov stated that he was willing to reduce his stake in Severstal from 82 % to 
somewhere between 40-45 %. The revenues that he would receive from the stock sale would 
be used for further acquisitions mainly in some iron ore and coal assets in the US. This would 
help him optimize costs. Back then, Pavel Shelekov, an analyst at the Kapital Investment 
Group commented that Mordashov was not very selective when buying low-profit businesses 
in the US. He said “the company could continue its expansion in the US or it could also enter 
new markets” (RBC, 2008). These acquisition plans were put on hold when the financial 
crisis erupted. Mordashov did not sell of his shares and since then in recent interviews given 
by him he announced that the company is seeking to expand to Africa as well as to countries 
like China, India and Indonesia. The reason was that the European and U.S. markets looked 
“less attractive” (Khrennikov, 2010). This has proved itself to be true. Severstal has already 
tried to sell of its stake in Lucchini because of the big debts that came along with the crisis. 
Nevertheless difficulties related to selling Lucchini, mainly because it does not look realistic 
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under current market conditions and also because of large debts have made it problematic for 
Severstal to stumble upon an interested buyer. With the current problems still being in place, 
decisions to instead deconsolidate the asset and present a business plan for the company´s 
development rather than trying to sell it off have looked more preferable (Interfax, 2011).  
4.3.3 Gerdau 
Gerdau, the Brazilian Steel giant is the world‟s second biggest producer of long steel as well 
the biggest in the Americas. Long Steel is a form of steel used for infrastructure and for 
building new sports arenas etc. (Hägerstrand, 2011).  
 
Gerdau puts its focus mainly on mini-mills, a small-scale production process that uses scrap 
as its main input. This small-scale production process makes it possible for the company to 
operate in a decentralized way close to its customers at competitive costs. The mini mills 
account for some 90 % of the company´s production (Ramamurti & Singh, 2009).  
 
The company is present in 14 countries around the world. The majority of them lie in South 
and North America with Spain and India being the only ones abroad (Gerdau, 2011).  
 
When founded back in 1901 by German immigrants its core activity was producing nails. The 
shift towards the steel industry came into existence in 1948 when the company bought 
Siderúrgica Riograndense (steel mill). Expansion abroad started in December 1980 when 
Gerdau acquired the Uruguayan Steel company Laisa. Acquisitions abroad were required in 
order to avoid operating solely on the volatile Brazilian market (Ramamurti & Singh, 2009). 
The acceleration of acquisitions by Gerdau peaked in the last decade when the number of 
corporations acquired in new countries grew from 9 in 2006 to 14 in 2008. The expansion that 
once started off with the buying of Laisa has led Gerdau to acquire new corporations in other 
neighbouring countries in South America.  The first taken steps outside of South America 
went to Canada when Gerdau acquired Courtice Steel (medium size mill). The biggest 
acquisition however occurred in 1999 when they bought Ameristeel (the first large mill). The 
result of the acquisition increased the overall production with 30 % (Johnson, 2006).  
 
More purchases lay ahead because there are still big possibilities for consolidation in the steel 
industry. The US is still an attractive market for Gerdau because it deals with metallic 
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construction and that has made the company especially interested in the American market. 
According to Charles Bradford, steel sector analysts from Bradford Research/Soleil Securities 
there are at least 20 companies in the US that Gerdau could acquire. He noted also that 
expansion in the US and the rest of North America made sense for Gerdau because “they 
know how to run mills and to find cost advantages” (Johnson, 2006). Expansions outside the 
Americas began when Gerdau acquired a 49 % stake in the Spanish company Corporación 
Sidenor. This acquisition increased their hopes of becoming a part of the automotive global 
value chain and also taking advantage of the growing demand for specialty long steel that are 
used in the automobile industry (Ramamurti & Singh, 2009).  
4.3.4 Tata Steel 
Being its flag barrier, Tata Steel is part of the Tata Group that besides from Tata Steel also 
contains six more companies within its group (Tata Steel, 2011).   
 
Its origin dates back to 1868 when the company was founded by Jamsetji Nusserwanji Tata. 
During his entire lifetime, Jamsetji Tata was captivated and led by three guiding stars, one of 
them being to build a steel company.  The other two were to generate hydro-electrics power 
and to create an institution that would offer the best education in science. The three guiding 
stars had to do with the Industrialization Revolution in England (Tata Steel, 2011). It had left 
India overwhelmed and convinced that if wanting to keep pace with the world it would have 
to master the scientific methods that arrived from the West (Tata Steel, 2011). The creation of 
a steel company became possible when they found their way to a village south of Calcutta 
called Sakchi in December 1907, later renamed Jamshedpur. A year later the first plant 
became functional and in the year that followed after that the blast furnaces, steel furnaces, 
coke ovens, the powerhouse and the machine shops were all laid down. The government 
contributed the best way they could, namely by building a railway to Gorumahisani. In 1912 
the first steel ingots from the plant began rolling out (Tata Steel, 2011).  
 
During the Great Depression the company survived by supplying nearly three-fourth of the 
country´s steel requirements. After having gained independence in 1949, the state of India 
awarded Tata to supply steel for its devised “Five-year Plans”. The company undertook many 
different projects like for instance the Bhakra-Nangal Project, the Howrah Bridge in Calcutta 
and the port at Kandla (Tata Steel, 2011). With the arrival of liberalization and deregulation 
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of the Indian economy following the reforms undertaken in 1991 Tata found itself in need for 
self-renewal. Therefore in order to stay competitive different measurements like for instance 
cost controls, optimization of IT support and a strong customer-centric were added (Radhika 
& Pallavi, 2005). These approaches created a cost leadership advantage at Tata which 
displayed itself in 2002 when the Steel prices were at their lowest. In that year Tata was the 
only company in the industry to show positive results (Radhika & Pallavi, 2005).  
 
With the newly gained cost leadership advantage at hand, Tata decided to go internationally. 
The first object for acquisition became the Singaporean steel company, NatSteel.  On August 
15
th
 2004, talks were being carried out between Tata Steel and NatSteel. Tata Steel was 
hoping to settle the deal because it was on the same day as India´s Independence Day. 
Unfortunately the talks spilled over to August 16
th
 before the deal was closed. The acquisition 
of NatSteel was India´s second biggest overseas acquisition ever right after the acquisition of 
Tetley by Tata Tea (Radhika & Pallavi, 2005). When Tata Steel acquired NatSteel the 
company had an output of 4-million-tonne (mt). The company´s desire back then was to 
increase the production to 15 mt by 2010. The acquisition of NatSteel did not increase the 
production that much because NatSteel´s annual production was only 2 mt. What instead 
made NatSteel attractive was the fact that the company provided access to customers in seven 
countries in South-East and East Asia, a region that consumes a third of the world´s steel 
(Radhika & Pallavi, 2005). However there was a second reason that affected the value chain. 
Steel as every other manufacturing industry has its own value chain. In the Steel industry it 
can be divided into two, primary steel-making and finishing.  Tata Steel´s strategy had been to 
break up the value chain and put each part where it was most cost-effective. While primary 
steel would for instance be produced in India where access to iron ore was huge, the semi-
finished would go to NatSteel for finishing (Radhika & Pallavi, 2005).  
 
In 2007 Tata Steel turned their eyes over to Europe and the steel company Corus. At that time 
Tata Steel was the 56
th
 largest steel producer in the world while Corus was the ninth largest. 
The planned acquisition of Corus did not go as smoothly as expected. The Brazilian steel 
producer, CSN, back then 49
th
 largest steel producer in the world, decided to get involved in 
the bidding process. After nine rounds of constant bidding head and forth Tata emerged as the 
winner (Sinha, 2010). The finalized acquisition cost Tata Steel US$12 billion dollars but 
increased the company´s production to 27 mt and saw Tata Steel become the fifth biggest 
steel company in the world.  The deal, which bonded a low-cost producer company who 
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already had a big presence in India, South East Asia and the Pacific-rim countries on one side 
and a high value added product range producer with strong positions in automotive, 
construction and packaging on the other side made Tata Steel second most global steel 
producer in the world with a presence in 45 countries (Tata Steel Europe, 2007).  
4.4 The telecommunication industry 
As one of the most important inventions of our time, the telephone has changed the lives of 
our grandparents and continues to do so even today. If we just compare our lives of just two 
decades ago to the hard-paced, constantly reachable lives of today, imagine just how different 
it would have been if we were prohibited from being able to call one another and arrange 
meetings or share information and place orders. Without the telephone and the 
telecommunication industry itself we would not have had the Internet, with all its endless 
possibilities.  
 
The most fascinating aspect of the telecommunication industry is that it affects every other 
industry. Sharing information simplifies instantly everyday business and enables a faster 
development. Although the debate over who actually invented the telephone goes on, Bell vs. 
Gray, the importance of the invention for the world remains unquestioned.  
 
With our focus being on the emerging markets, our area of interest for the telecommunication 
industry lies within how it has and how it is affecting the development of these parts of the 
world.  
 
In the eighties, the large western companies that operated in this industry decided to put their 
faith to the  emerging markets in order to grow and the hope of  having a piece of the pie 
(Oliver Wyman, 2009). Today however, companies from developing countries have risen to 
be those that navigate more successfully the waters of telecommunication in Asia, Latin 
America and Africa.  
 
Below us are now the four chosen companies in this industry that we will embark on with 
America Movil being the first one.    
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4.4.1 America Móvil 
America Móvil, is today the fourth largest telecom operator in the world (Reuters, 2009). It 
has approximately 300 million subscribers and is one of the biggest companies in Latin 
America. The most astonishing aspect of America Móvil has been their rapid expansion 
throughout Latin America. Its current structure was formed as late as in 2000 as a result of a 
spin-off from the former Mexican giant Telmex (Morningstar Analyst Report, 2010). Their 
growth strategies were implemented immediately where they applied the LLL theory at its 
best. They focused on more developed companies in their region, most of them western and 
linked up with them through joint ventures. One example of this was in Brazil, to where they 
entered shortly after the spin-off from Telmex. They formed a Joint Venture with Bell Canada 
International and SBC Communications, today widely known as AT&T which enabled them a 
fast penetration of the competitive Brazilian market (Telecoms, 2008). 
 
Despite the well-executed ways of linking and leverage, what was most crucial for America 
Móvil was their timing and how well prepared for the telecommunication crisis they were. 
When the crisis hit, other struggled to cope with their main business and to not having to let 
go of too much labour, AM on the other hand engaged in an offensive plan to take advantage 
of the situation (Telecoms, 2008). For the many western carriers that operated in the region, 
the struggle was to finance business in their home markets which enabled America Móvil and 
the deep pockets of its founder Carlos Slim Helu to purchase lucrative and undervalued 
operations. (Kroll, 2010) 
 
To give a broader picture of how America Móvil engaged in acquisitions and how they 
further made use of the LLL framework, their activities in Argentina, Columbia and The 
United States will be discussed.  
 
 In Argentina, AM entered through an acquisition of the relatively small player CTI in 2003 
with 17% market share at the time of the purchase which made them the 4
th
 largest operator in 
Argentina (Randewich, 2003). This was again an example of how AM take advantage of 
problems in other companies, since CTI struggled with debt and had to restructure, AM had a 
strong bargaining position. Part of $90 million spent in the acquisition would be used to pay 
off debt and the rest of to restructure the company to meet the needs of America Móvil. As 
Manuel Jimenez a Mexican analyst pointed out at the time of the purchase;” "It's a strategic 
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investment with the objective of grabbing a market that had high cash-flow generation,” 
(Randewich, 2003). The purchase proved to be successful and today AM holds over 30% 
market share in Argentina. (Americamovil, 2011) 
 
The same strategy was used earlier when AM entered Colombia in 2000. Colombia is an 
important market in Latin America due to its vast population. It holds substantial potential but 
also involves considerable risk because of the reluctance of the Columbian people to most 
things foreign. Through acquisitions of two Colombian companies with debt issues,  Comcel 
and Occel (Telecoms, 2008), AM was able to fast gain entrance to this markets and by 
operating under the acquired brand names the procedure ran swiftly and through smart 
marketing and a long adoption process, they soon successfully converted the two acquired 
brand names into its own. Today Colombia is a crucial market for AM with over 23 million 
subscribers. (Americamovil, 2011) 
 
The story of American Móvil in the United States is also one of strategic purchases; again this 
would not have been possible if it was not for the never-ending belief of Carlos Slim that 
America Móvil would show to be a good investment. The most important acquisition in the 
US proved to be Tracfone which at the time of the acquisition served about 700 000 
customers (Telecoms, 2008). AM formed partnerships with mayor retailers across the US that 
permitted them to sell prepaid AM cards (under the Tracfone-brand), together with handheld 
GSM devices at these retailers. This proved to be immensely successful since it targeted a, 
before this, forgotten segment of the US market; the low-income segment with customers not 
willing or not able to sign up for long-term subscriptions (Telecoms, 2008). The customer 
base grew at an astonishing rate and by late 2008 AM, through its subsidiary Tracfone served 
9, 5 million customers (Telecoms, 2008), an annual increase of over 35%. 
 
The most important common factors in the entrance to these three markets were that in all of 
them AM targeted “their” customers. Markets targeted were from the beginning markets 
similar to their own, for the western world these markets are seen as peripheral markets, far 
from the competitive markets of Europe, Japan or the US. However, the entrance to the US 
serves as the exception of the rule (Telecoms, 2008). They did nevertheless still target 
customers similar to those in their domestic Mexican one. The low-income segment, earlier 
mentioned, was mainly one of Latin American Spanish speakers. Their Latin American 
heritage and approach served them well in acquiring customers from this segment.  
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Another crucial factor in their US approach was the way they used linkage to gain market 
shares, e.g. their collaboration with important retailers across the country (Telecoms, 2008). 
4.4.2 Orascom 
Orascom, is the only case example used in this thesis from Africa. With origins from Egypt it 
is today a global company with a broad focus on the middle-east and Africa. It was founded 
as late as 1998 and expanded regionally very fast. Today it is the number one telecom 
operator both in Africa and in the middle-east. The aggressive strategy used to obtain this 
position was through strategic acquisitions. (WIR, 2010) 
 
One of the most intriguing aspects of Orascom is its former leader, Naguid Sawaris, who is 
one of the most influential businessmen in the middle-east. It was his vision and his 
determination that took Orascom to where they are today as fast as it did. Orascom strategies 
differ from the teleoperators of the west in terms of focus (Ihlenfeld, Karafa, McCord and 
Qadir, 2010). Instead of putting their effort in already developed markets, Orascom and Mr. 
Sawaris identified the potential of the emerging markets and realised the importance of acting 
as a first-mover in these markets. As of now, they operate in seven emerging markets which 
although they have a relatively low teledensity, about 30%, the promise of these regions are 
stunning (Ihlenfeld, Karafa, McCord and Qadir, 2010). 
 
Mr Sawari did not have a global scope from the start; instead he wanted Orascom to be the 
telecommunications provider to sub-Saharan Africa (Ihlenfeld, Karafa, McCord and Qadir, 
2010). In this quest he learned that there were more markets with similar features, particularly 
in the middle-east. He formed a strategy to which they have kept until only recently, 
Orascom, where to enter underdeveloped markets with potential, even if it involved 
substantial risk. They should always move swiftly and aim to become market leader (or at 
least second largest) within 2 years. Their way into Iraq is a brilliant example of how this is 
conducted. 
 
Only four months after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Orascom launched its first telecom 
network there, Iraqna. They invested heavily but with all the problems of setting up a business 
in the troubled Iraq they failed to attain the top positions they aspired to. Orascom had tried 
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and failed and hence in 2007 it sold its subsidiary Iraqna to Zain (Kuwait). This shows that 
the firm is willing to take a risk but also willing to accept a failure and to move on (Ihlenfeld, 
Karafa, McCord & Qadir, 2010). The same strategy was used in Pakistan which proved to be 
more successful. Today the vast country is the most important market for Orascom and they 
hold over 25 million subscribers (Ihlenfeld, Karafa, McCord & Qadir, 2010). 
 
Analysts argue over if this aggressive strategy still holds. In recent years, Orascom have 
become known to expand into markets where practically no one else dares e.g. North Korea 
(Noland, 2010).There they first entered in 2008 with a joint venture with the government 
owned telecompany, CHEO technology. Due to this collaboration Orascom secured a 25 year 
licence to operate in North Korea. To get this deal granted, the company had to announce 
heavy investment in the country and promised to invest $200 million the first year, followed 
by $100 million the succeeding two years. This will be an important boost to the North 
Korean economy and hopefully for Orascom, the potential weighs up the risk. The main issue, 
analysts argue over is of course the North Korean government and its intentions (Noland, 
2010). Will the government maintain its commitments and not defect from the agreement is a 
question that only time can answer. Mr Sawari defend their investment in an interview with 
CNBC; "the world is coming to an end when it comes to mobile telephones, so the 
opportunities are very scarce. You really have to go wherever you get a chance and [North 
Korea] is one of the last." (Knowledge at Wharton, 2010) 
 
In May 2005, Orascom made its first move into the more developed countries when they 
acquired the Italian operator, WIND telecommunications. This proved that Orascom meant 
serious business in the western markets. (WIR, 2006) but everything did not hold up to the 
expectations. When the financial crisis hit the telecommunication industry WIND was struck 
severely. Targets were not met and Mr Sawari stepped back from his position as CEO. For 
Orascom this served as a valuable yet expensive lesson which almost put an end to the 
previously successful story of Orascom. Mr Sawari‟s successor was Khaled Bichara, former 
head of WIND Italy and it is he who holds the future of Orascom in his hands. Bichara and 
his team tried to make Italy work for them but due to the state of affairs after the crisis he took 
the decision of letting go of WIND and in March 2011 the fusion of WIND Italy and the 
relatively new Russian player Vimpelcon were approved by regulators (Reuters, 2011).  
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One can imagine that it was back to basics for Orascom after this failure but a new approach 
was taken. Instead of trying to compete with western actors at their terms as with WIND Italy 
they now aimed for the developed North American market with the purchase of WIND 
Canada. In Canada they will not continue with the existing strategy, instead. Orascom aims to 
focus on the low-end segment, trying to fight the large American giants with a low-price 
strategy (Reuters, 2011).  
4.4.3 ZTE 
ZTE, was founded 1985 as an offshoot of China‟s ministry of Aerospace Industry and is 
today the second largest manufacturer of telecom equipment in China after Huawei. ZTE now 
has a global presence and serves customers in over 60 countries. (ZTE, 2011) 
 
ZTE signed its first international deal in 1999 when they entered Pakistan. The first phase of 
their internationalization had a clear focus to developing markets where the competition was 
less fierce (ZTE, 2011).  
 
Since those early days of internationalization, the purpose has been to penetrate not only 
developing markets but also the western, well matured countries. They have used a tactic of 
first installing R&D offices in the mature markets to conduct substantial research of the 
specific countries to where they wish to enter (Total Telecom, 2006). Only later when the 
timing and external market circumstances have been judged right by the R&D offices have 
they opened up a sales office. This tactic was employed to minimize risk and to avoid cultural 
obstacles (ZTE, 2011).  
 
ZTE use strategic innovations to compete with the severe competition in the industry. One 
such strategy has been to be deeply involved in the standardization process to be seen as a 
forward-looking company (Jiang, 2005). Another important strategic issue in the success of 
ZTE‟s internationalization has been to internationalize through localization. In other words, 
link with locally strong players to gain local presence and hence penetrate markets this way 
(Jiang, 2005). Two different forms of collaborations have mostly been used. The most 
important form of partnerships is with foreign tech-companies as distribution and service 
partner in the local markets, e.g. with Ericsson in 2005, the second crucial type is as a 
technology and solution provider, for example with Switchcore, also in 2005 (Jiang, 2005). 
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As with many successful Chinese companies, ZTE have benefited from their connections and 
relationship to the government. The most obvious case is when foreign companies expand 
into China. Several times has the government favoured ZTE as a partner for the foreign 
MNCs and stood behind them in negotiations e.g. demanding technological transfer to ZTE in 
exchange for allowance of venturing into a new part of China. 
4.4.4 Huawei 
Without doubt the most fascinating company from an emerging market in the 
telecommunication industry is the Chinese giant Huawei Technology. Huawei was 
established as late as 1988 in Hong Kong and the development have been rapid even with 
Chinese standards. It now is the third largest telecom equipment maker in the world (Huawei, 
2011). 
 
Today Huawei is hence the largest telecom equipment company in China and their products 
have been deployed in over 140 countries and used by 46 of the world‟s top 50 operators 
(Huawei, 2011). There is plenty to say about Huawei but due to the limitation of this thesis, 
the focus point will be their global expansion and the strategies used. 
 
The global scope was not obvious from the very beginning due to the massive domestic 
market. Huawei believed that this would be sufficient and perhaps it would if the prices were 
higher (Harney, 2005). Eventually they realised that they were even more competitive outside 
of China than within because of their price which compared to other international rivals were 
often as low as 30% lower (Harney, 2005). Their strategy were first to compete in other 
developing countries since they still were not able to compete as much as they would like on 
quality and product.  
 
Their first international act was to open up a R&D centre in Bangalore, India, in 1997 
(Huawei, 2011) and this was important in many ways. First of all it was in India, famous for 
its high standards in education in IT and technology. This enabled Huawei to gain access to 
technology they did not yet possess. Bangalore was also a hub for international tech 
companies and because they were present here they were able to link up with several 
international western firms (Jiang, 2005).  
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Only a few years later, in 2000, Huawei made it first move in western markets by setting up a 
R&D centre in Stockholm, Sweden (Huawei, 2011). This is a good example of how Huawei 
work when they expand globally. First, they establish a R&D centre in a strategic city where 
they both can benefit from the research but perhaps more importantly from what they learn 
about the specific market. Usually the Research centres are followed by a sales office within 
two or three years. Due to the heavy market research they conduct in every new country, they 
are well prepared for meeting the customers need. Stockholm and Sweden were partly chosen 
because of the significance of the Nordic companies in the industry, e.g. Ericsson and Nokia 
(China Stakes, 2009).  
 
In the case of Stockholm and because of the global IT crisis in the early days of the new 
millennia, the sales office in Sweden was delayed and the first European contract was instead 
with a Dutch operator Telfort in 2004. Since that first contract, the expansion of Huawei has 
not been limited to the developing countries, instead it have rather been as aggressive in the 
western more matured markets (China Stakes, 2009). 
 
As touched upon above, the prices were undoubtedly a mayor reason for the early success in 
their globalization. It contributed largely to why they as a new unproven player won deals 
over several much larger competitors.  The fascinating feature of Huawei is that they unlike 
many other Chinese firms seems to understand that being cheap is only a short-term 
competitive advantage which they need to step away from in order to last. They now compete 
more on quality than on price and this is can be noted in their current effort of setting up a 
global service platform (Jiang, 2005). The quality of this service platform is guaranteed by the 
20 research centres Huawei now has outside of China in strategic places (Huawei, 2010). 
Because of this planning, Huawei seems well prepared for the future and they will no longer 
be too dependent of their low labour cost in China. 
 
Another aspect of their aim to change their customers‟ perception of themselves as a mere 
economical competitor is how they work with R&D. As stated above Huawei have a solid 
base of centres for research and the company‟s CEO; Ren Zhengfe points out that it is the 
most vital part of the company (The Economist, 2004) and noteworthy is the contra-trend they 
are adapting in strategy when it comes to R&D. Other companies move more and more of 
their research facilities to China due to the cost advantage, Huawei moves in the opposite 
  
- 50 - 
direction and Mr Zhengfe and the rest of the board believe that this is what will make Huawei 
succeed in the long run (The Economist, 2009). 
 
As we have seen above, Huawei have both strong FSAs and CSAs. What is firm-specific is 
above all other its investments in R&D and the country-specific advantages comes with all 
what being a Chinese company means for example in terms of the earlier mentioned financial 
backing. 
5. Analysis 
The focus will be to explain how these companies have internationalized through the lens of 
the given theories. We commence with an analysis of the industries by themselves before 
comparing the two in the conclusion. In the analysis we map the companies‟ position in the 
FSA/CSA matrix by investigating their strengths in FSAs and/or in CSAs. We then compare 
the companies first to the matrix then to the LLL theory in order to find similarities or 
differences.  
5.1 Analysis of the steel industry 
When trying to analyse the steel companies many similarities and differences between them 
pop up.  In the FSA/CSA matrix they all demonstrate strong CSAs. The answer to this is 
simple: they come from some of the biggest countries in the world that contain strong labour 
forces while most of them are also rich on natural resources.  
However more differences occur then similarities. Attempts of trying to apply the LLL theory 
to their businesses are so far only related to Tata Steel and Severstal. Others like BaoSteel 
totally lack a LLL approach. In BaoSteels case it has to do with the fact that the company has 
not yet decided to internationalize. Because the role of the state is too interconnected with the 
decisions made in Chinese corporate boardrooms it is hard to determine in BaoSteel´s case 
whether the choice for internationalization has been determined by the government or because 
of the fact that BaoSteel simply lacks the FSAs needed for expanding. Severstal on the other 
hand with its CEO Mordashov have run the company without having the Russian government 
on their backs. For how long they will be allowed to continue operating this freely depends on 
if/when Putin decides that the Russian steel industry should be categorized as “strategic”. 
Such a concern is not needed in the case of Tata Steel. The reform process in 1991 has 
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liberated Indian companies. No plans or fears of future renationalization of companies or 
industries exist on the table; on the contrary, deregulating processes are being further realized 
at the same time as the government continues decreasing its role in the economy. Gerdau who 
is a privately owned company has never had the Brazilian state questioning their choices of 
expansion, not even during the import-substitution era.  
Being successful as Gerdau is one thing, trying to broaden its business activities into new 
sectors of the Steel industry is something totally different. Gerdau has so far focused mainly 
on what they are best at: turn over struggling companies. They have however started 
expanding into new areas. The acquisition of the Spanish company Corporación Sidenor was 
done in order to become a part of the automotive industry but also because of the huge 
demand that exists for long steel, a kind of steel that Gerdau is the second highest producer of 
in the world. Broadening its business activities in a very successful way is something that 
Tata Steel has achieved best. With the acquisition of Corus they have expanded into the high-
value product sector. This creates big synergies when combining Tatas cost leadership with 
Corus strong position in the high-value segment.  
With the steel industry being a mature market containing a lot of competitors in it, 
acquisitions act more or less as a rule when expanding abroad. This means that the steel 
companies have to have strong balances with a lot of money. When BaoSteel decides to 
internationalize in the near future and this being made in the form of acquisitions, financing 
them will not be a problem especially not when having the government loaning them money 
for favourable rates. State support is something that Severstal cannot count on but their source 
for money can instead be found in the pockets of its wealthy CEO Mordashov. This applies 
also for Tata Steel and Gerdau who have drawn in financial support from the families that 
founded them.  
Before moving on to the analysis of the chosen companies we now aim to give a clearer view 
of how the companies compare by placing them within the FSA/CSA matrix where we 
identify their differences within the framework.  
Figure 5.1 The position of the steel companies within the FSA/CSA matrix 
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5.1.1 BaoSteel 
If we start off with BaoSteel we can see that the company is a state-owned one. Therefore the 
role of the state is strong in the case of BaoSteel. This has been observed in such way that 
BaoSteel acquires abroad only iron ores and mines that are seen as strategically important for 
the future supply of the growing Chinese economy. When taking away the role of the state 
and only focusing on the company itself we can once again by looking back in the section 
about BaoSteel see that the company lacks FSAs. The absence of a strategy for international 
expansion and integration of foreign companies together hand in hand with former acquisition 
failures clearly show that FSAs lack. It could however be questioned regarding if the 
company really does not have them. After all the company has over the years taken over 
struggling domestic steel companies and turned them into profitable ones. Since this has been 
difficult to gather information about and also the questions remain about how much the 
influence of the state has been in the success of the domestic mergers we have concluded 
based on the existing information that BaoSteel should be put in quadrant 1 with a strong 
CSA and weak FSA. 
Because BaoSteel is a company that has yet to expand globally it is difficult to apply the LLL 
strategy. If they would choose to expand they would have to do it in the same way all other 
Steel companies do, that is to say through acquisitions. When choosing to acquire a company 
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they would have to acquire one that differs from their own in terms of production ways, 
marketing and all the other things that would make BaoSteel uncompetitive.  
5.1.2 Severstal 
In the case of Severstal as well as for other Russian MNCs operating in the natural resource 
industry the decision for deciding where to put them on the CSA/FSA matrix is a little bit 
tricky. Severstals aim with its acquisitions is exactly similar to those of other Russian MNCs 
in the same industry, that is to say they want to gain access to the downstream sector. This is 
something already earlier mentioned in the case when it comes to the motives behind Russian 
M&As. Also the geographical dispersion of the M&As are the same because Severstals 
acquisitions have been made with companies originating from North America and Europe. 
Deciding now if Severstal has a strong FSA is not easy. The company´s aim is clearly to gain 
strong FSAs. However the financial crisis of 2008 has deeply affected the company. The 
many M&As seem to have backfired and the markets of the developed countries are now less 
attractive. This can be seen in Severstals desire to sell off for example Lucchini. Lucchini has 
not proven to be profitable and this raises the question whether Severstal has strong FSAs 
when it comes to keeping acquired companies profitable. The conclusion on where Severstal 
should be is somewhere on the line between quadrant 1 and 3. That they have a strong CSA is 
nothing new, however they do not seem to quite yet be there when it comes to having a strong 
FSA. Time will simply have to tell if Severstal will be able to make the leap to quadrant 3. 
As a company very keen on acquiring other companies in order to gain access to the high-
value segment, the LLL theory can be applied to Severstal. Severstal has tried to link itself to 
special niche areas of the Steel industry.  This has been expressed in the acquisitions of 
American companies that specialize in segments like machining and welding as well as other 
like French companies that are market leaders in the SBQ market.   
5.1.3 Gerdau 
Gerdau is something entirely different when being compared to BaoSteel and Severstal. The 
difference lies in the fact that the company has both strong CSAs and FSAs. The FDI during 
the import-substitute era in Brazil saw much of the know-how spill over to Brazilian 
companies. This was reflected in that way that Gerdau being one of the first ones to pick this 
up was also one of the first Brazilian companies to expand abroad when they made their first 
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acquisition way back in 1980. Over time Gerdau has created strong FSAs in its decentralized 
way of operating and finding cost advantages. This has pushed them searching for other 
struggling companies, mainly in the US. Worth also therefore noting is that the company`s 
expansion reflects the OFDI made by Brazilian companies with the Americas. The conclusion 
on where Gerdau should be on the CSA/FSA matrix is quadrant 3.  
Since their first acquisition abroad in 1980, Gerdau has for over the last 20-25 years continued 
acquiring struggling companies and therefore showed no attachments to the LLL theory. 
However this changed with the acquisition of Sidenór. This was the first step for Gerdau in a 
totally new sector of the steel industry where the company is not strong. It will be interesting 
to see how they will be able to mix their current know-how with the new one from Sidenór in 
order to create new synergies.   
5.1.4 Tata Steel 
Also like Gerdau, Tata Steel is a company that belongs in quadrant 3. It is a private company, 
which means that the Indian government does not intervene in Tata Steels expansion plans. 
The company has after the liberalization of the economy in 1991 managed to transform itself 
into a cost-leader company. With this they have created a strong FSA that other Steel 
companies lack. Their expansion has reflected the pattern of other Indian companies which 
choose to expand to developed countries. In Tata´s case this has been Singapore and Europe. 
Despite the fact that the company already has a strong FSA they seem to want to further 
enhance it. This was the case of Corus. With the acquisition of it Tata gained access to the 
high-value sector. Now the company`s FSA is stronger than ever before because it contains 
not anymore one but several FSAs. 
Tata Steel has made most use of the LLL theory. As earlier mentioned the purchase of Corus 
linked the company to a new sector in the industry. It has now enabled Tata Steel to pick out 
the strengths and advantages of Corus in their operational activities that Tata does not have 
and vice-versa in order to strengthen the overall productivity of the company.  
5.2 Analysis of the telecommunication industry 
When looking at the two different types of companies in the telecommunication industry from 
emerging markets, operators and manufacturers, several similarities in strategy have been 
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identified. One important aspect have been the first moves in their internationalization which 
in all cases started regionally before trying to secure a position in more mature markets . The 
level of success differs widely between manufacturers and operators. Where operators 
struggle to make operations in developed markets profitable, these markets serve as the most 
lucrative ones for the manufacturers. Our belief is that this is due to the strategy used by the 
manufacturers in the developed countries. Manufacturers have used the advantages that they 
do carry by being late-comers from under-developed countries. These advantages include low 
labour-cost as well as not having to invest as much on R&D in their infancy as their 
predecessors. Through this they have been able to cut themselves a large chunk of the market 
by competing first with price and later moving up the ladder by competing also in product and 
quality.  
 
In the FSA/CSA framework, companies from the telecommunication industry are quite 
similar. With the growing strength of the FSAs of ZTE, all of the four companies analysed 
now have strong FSAs and are therefore positioned in the third or the fourth quadrant in the 
matrix. 
 
Another important similarity is the way companies from emerging markets make use of the 
LLL framework. There seem to be a common factor to enter a new market by collaborations 
with important actors locally before entering in full force. Often this is achieved by joint 
ventures to gain the needed market knowledge before expanding when the market conditions 
are preferable. The manufacturers in the industry form allegiances with developed 
technologically skilled companies in order to leverage and learn from them. For operators this 
differs as they tend to focus more upon strategic acquisitions rather than pure collaborations. 
It is still however within the framework of linking since they have a propensity of starting off 
with a relatively small joint venture (JV) before throwing themselves into new markets with a 
fully owned local subsidiary. 
 
What is most significant with the new telecom companies from the emerging markets is their 
global scope. From an early stage they set out to be truly global companies instead of 
something growing from a local base to a global one. These companies have the aim of 
operate globally from the start. To go into a new country is not seen as a way of taking its 
domestic market abroad, instead it is seen as simple another part of the global market in 
which they already operate. 
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The largest difference between telecom EMNCs is found within the Chinese companies and 
in the prominence of their government. The success of ZTE and the one of Huawei would 
neither have been possible without their close ties to the Chinese government. Since the early 
nineties, the Chinese government has been supportive to equipment makers. For instance they 
formed an industrial policy with the sole purpose of boosting the prospects of Chinese firms 
at home and abroad. The government has since provided both companies with substantial 
financial backing when needed and also assessed them in political conflicts with foreign 
companies within China.  
 
The final remark about the examples from the emerging markets is that they still do not hold 
very large global market shares but they have however had an enormous effect on the industry 
itself since they have brought down costs and consolidation across the industry.  
 
As were the case of the analysis of the steel companies, a figure of the companies‟ positions 
in the matrix will be used to show how the telecommunication companies compare within the 
FSA/CSA framework. 
 
Figure 5.2 The position of the telecom companies within the FSA/CSA matrix. 
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5.2.1 America Móvil 
In the case of America Móvil, the FSA/CSA framework apply, in which AM has a distinctive 
firm-specific advantage in their strong finances. The country-specific advantages are not as 
obvious and with, all other equal: their Mexican origin could very well have been another one 
e.g., Brazil or Argentina. They have some CSAs in having a large domestic market, enabling 
them to grow domestically first but this is not enough to place them in the third box. Hence in 
the quadrant they are positioned in the fourth.  
 
America Móvil uses the LLL- theory to a high degree, especially when entering a new 
market. They make sure they have the connections needed to grow and they gain knowledge 
through teaming up with important collaborators in the new market. An example can be found 
in their entrance to the mature market of the United States where they linked with large 
retailers across the country. This is one way of gaining access both to market information and 
to the market itself. 
5.2.2 Orascom 
In the FSA/CSA matrix, Orascom with their firm-specific advantages, their aggressive 
strategy and strong leadership of the past also enter box nr 4. Their strong finances in the 
early days were also one of the then crucial FSAs. When one looks at the CSAs, the case is 
very much like that of AM of Mexico. The country itself does not do much to describe the 
success of neither AM nor Orascom. The characteristics of their domestic market are still 
important, as with Mexico, it serves as a sufficiently large market, which enable them to first 
grow domestically before expanding operations abroad. 
 
The presence of LLL is not as evident here as it is with the other case examples. Orascom of 
course have used it in the past to gain technological know-how and improved market 
knowledge but the Orascom of today is setting its own course of actions. If the departure from 
LLL is one of the reasons for the turbulence of recent years needs more research. 
Nevertheless, one can conclude that the use of collaborations and JVs in the past helped them 
to a great extent. Their expansion would not have been as rapid or as large without their 
alliances to and their acquisitions of strategic players, e.g. WIND. 
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5.2.3 ZTE 
As expected of a Chinese firm, it is the country-specific advantages that stand out when 
looking to the FSA/CSA matrix. As shown in the empirical research, their success has much 
to do with their relationship to, and support from the Chinese state. Also as with the other 
case example the sheer size of the domestic market is one crucial factor for them. If they were 
to compete on a much smaller market, one can argue that the competition had been too fierce 
for ZTE in the early days. As it was, there was room for many actors on the domestic stage. 
 
They do, however, possess a few FSAs worth mentioning. In particular, they are strong when 
it comes to their R&D department. Huge investments have been made and it appears to be 
working. They have, as Huawei, succeeded in moving from their initial price advantages to 
being able to compete more on quality.  
 
With this being said, in the matrix, ZTE have long been positioned in the first quadrant of the 
FSA/CSA matrix but with the efforts and investment of recent years they move towards the 
third quadrant of having both strong CSAs and FSAs. 
 
The forming of partnerships has had a vital part in the global expansion of ZTE, and without 
the linkage to more developed tech-companies, e.g. Ericsson they would not have had the 
prerequisites needed for competing on a global scene. 
5.2.4 Huawei 
As we have seen above, Huawei have both strong FSAs and CSAs and are therefore placed in 
quadrant 4. The firm-specifics are above all other its investments in R&D and its use of 
linkage. The country-specific advantages come with all what being a Chinese company means 
for example in terms of the earlier mentioned financial backing from the government and with 
the magnitude of their domestic market. 
 
As stated earlier in the thesis, Huawei serves as the best example of how the LLL theory can 
be applied to describe the success of an EMNC. Their use of the different aspects of the 
theory has largely been responsible for their triumph in expanding globally, in particular when 
it comes to going into developed markets. 
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To give an example of how this can work we look at their modes of entry to a new market. 
Huawei realises the importance of clusters and how knowledge is more easily attained closer 
to where the action is. Hence in their strategy of opening R&D centres in the wanted new 
markets they tend to localize nearby the competition and close to universities. By setting up 
such centres they not only gain access to knowledge of a technical base, they also draw 
advantages by gaining substantial market knowledge before entering the market with a sales 
office.  
6.  Conclusion 
In the two analyses we have conducted, we aim now to conclude how these industries 
compare with the selected theories. We head off by first looking at the FSA/CSA theory. 
After having examined the EMNCs in accordance to the FSA/CSA, a clear distinction has 
been notified amongst the two industries. The backgrounds of the steel companies showed us 
that they all possessed strong CSAs. Nevertheless only some of them had over time managed 
to create FSAs while others did not. Since the steel industry`s level of maturity is extremely 
high, the need for strong FSAs is not crucial when wanting to internationalize. However, we 
have seen that despite the maturity levels in the industry, most of the steel companies are keen 
on improving their FSAs. With this they hope to enter new segments of the industry by 
combining their CSAs with the acquired companies FSAs.  This has for example been noticed 
mainly in the case of Tata Steel but also to a certain degree with Severstal. Therefore to 
conclude, the steel companies of the BRIC countries should be placed in the quadrants 1 and 
3.  
The telecommunication industry shows another side of the coin. Here the FSAs play a vital 
part in being able to expand successfully. This is due to the level of technology needed in the 
industry which requires the companies to invest heavily in R&D and therefore gaining strong 
FSAs. These FSAs are vital in the industry for new companies wanting to expand globally. In 
this case the CSAs have only a marginal role. In the countries where the CSAs do exist, they 
are only present in size and openness of the domestic markets. 
To summarize it up, the differences between the two industries in comparison to the 
FSA/CSA framework are the following; when wanting to internationalize, the need for strong 
FSAs act as a key factor for EMNCs in the telecommunication industry while in the mature 
steel industry it is the opposite. Here the CSAs contribute to a larger extent when choosing to 
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go abroad. In addition, there exists one interesting feature in the steel industry, where there is 
a drive towards stronger FSAs. The purpose of it is to further boost the level of profitability. 
This is something that is deficient in the telecom industry. 
When comparing the EMNCs to the second theory, the LLL, noticeable differences between 
the industries are observed. In the steel industry, LLL is starting to be implemented by the 
companies primarily through acquisitions. The best example of this is Tata Steel, which has 
purchased Corus in order to get access to some of their know-how and competencies but the 
acquisition serves as a two way LLL, where Corus also realised the potential benefit from the 
cost-leadership advantage of Tata Steel. 
In the telecom industry acquisitions exist but are not equally dominating. The use of JVs is 
more present since it enables companies from less developed countries to gain access to 
advanced technology from Western firms. The advantages of JVs also lie in the financial 
aspects. To form a partnership is less costly than to purchase a competitor and it could mean 
comparable positive linkage. 
To summarize the LLL theory we believe that the dissimilarity exists due to the diverse levels 
in maturity. It can most often be seen in the usage of linkage. In the steel industry it takes its 
form entirely in the shape of strategic acquisitions. JV on the other hand is the more 
preferable way of linking used by telecommunication EMNCs.  
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